The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.
In This Issue...
Testing Legal
In "A Shred of Evidence on Public Acceptance of Privately Issued Currency" Restrictions (p. 2), Martin S. Eichenbaum and Neil Wallace report two recent cases where privately issued coupons began circulating in Canada as currency. Because these were store coupons, they were not initially subject to Canada's prohibition against the issue of private currency. These cases support a key tenet of the legal restrictions theory of money: namely, that without restrictions, private arbitragers would issue liabilities, backed by interest-bearing securities, which the public would accept as currency. This theory (described in Wallace's winter 1983 Quarterly Review article) holds that high interest rates are possible because of government restrictions against such arbitrage, and it suggests that doing away with these restrictions would make monetary policy ineffective.
Adding to Arithmetic
In "Deficits, Interest Rates, and the Tax Distribution" (p. 5), S. Rao Aiyagari demonstrates the importance of the tax distribution in determining the relationship between budget deficits and interest rates. Aiyagari's point received little attention in previous Quarterly Review articles on budget deficits and monetarist arithmetic (see below). Aiyagari constructs a simple model to show that higher deficits need not imply higher interest rates. By manipulating the way taxes are distributed among agents, he demonstrates that it is possible to have an unchanged real interest rate when government consumption is raised and total taxes are unchanged. He also shows that when total taxes are lowered without changing government consumption, taxes can be redistributed so that interest rates are unaffected. The key to these results is that the tax distribution is changed to keep the relative distribution of wealth unchanged.
